Military Twitter has been on fire for days debating whether the armed and armored vehicles the US and its allies recently decided to send to Ukraine constitute tanks, which could be read as a significant escalation in the war against Russia. The debate centers on the precise form and function of the new combat vehicles, but it is lost sight of.
It is true that neither the American-built Bradley nor the French- and German-built AMX-10RC and Marder vehicles, respectively, fit the technical definition of a tank, which is generally defined as the combination of a tracked hull with a turret. containing a large caliber gun howitzer. (The guns on the Bradley and Marder are of smaller caliber, while the AMX has wheels instead of tracks.) But, far more important, they provide the kind of armored maneuverability required to drive the Russians out of the Ukraine.
Until recently, NATO states have been reluctant to hand over their internally designed heavy armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine due to the perception that they are offensive weapons of aggression that Russia could harness to expand the scope of the war. But deadlier and more technically advanced weapons like HIMARS artillery rockets Y PzH-2000 armored howitzers they have already been transferred to Ukraine without triggering the Russian pushback that many in the West feared.
Now the war is about to enter its second year. Over the past summer, the focus has been on helping Ukraine fend off Russian advances, which it has done admirably. But to end the conflict, Ukraine must go on the offensive to drive out Russia.
Kyiv has already scored some offensive victories. Last fall, he successfully liberated Kharkiv and much of Kherson province, campaigns made possible by Western artillery donationsammunition and Transportation and Vehicles. But now, future Ukrainian offensives will be more challenging as Russia has retreated to more defensible positions and recruited new troops. Although the new soldiers are poorly trained and equipped, the massive recruitment means Russian forces are not as undermanned as they were last year.
In an earlier phase of the war, I argued that heavy armored vehicles from the West were not the most efficient form of assistance to Ukraine due to the complexity of bringing such expensive and logistically demanding systems into service compared to the well-known vehicles and previous Soviet vehicles. cost-effective artillery and donated man-portable missile weapons for the then Ukrainian defensive warfare.
But the Ukrainian armed forces now have a clear record of integrating successfully and quickly technically advanced weapons even with serious logistical challenges. And despite the drawbacks of providing these more sophisticated vehicles, armored vehicles can help capture ground where artillery, even if more deadly and at least as important, alone cannot.
Artillery can inflict massive destruction from a distance, and can do so on a relatively continuous basis. But someone needs to fight their way into the defensive positions and population centers occupied by the enemy forces in order to drive them out. Ideally this is done by a combination of armored vehicles and infantry; the former provide the firepower and mobility, and the latter are dropped from vehicles like the Bradley to locate the enemy in tight terrain and establish defensive positions in trenches, woods, and buildings once the area is secured.
However, since Ukraine does not have enough Soviet-designed BMP infantry fighting vehicles, similar in concept to the Bradley and Marder, their infantry are often registered charging into battle in lightly armored Humvee trucks and other vehicles that were never intended to lead attacks against large conventional armies.
Even if they’re not tanks, Bradley and Marder weigh almost twice as much What Ukrainian BMP vehicles, due in part to heavier armour, which greatly improves the chances that the vehicle and its passengers will survive enemy fire. And unlike most Soviet BMPs, the Bradley, AMX-10RC Y marder they have sophisticated thermal sights that will make them more likely to detect and destroy enemy forces, especially at night.
Of course, these vehicles can still be disabled by weapons designed to kill heavy tanks. But their better sensors, armor, and weapons mean they can be used much more aggressively to try and break through enemy lines and free up territory.
Importantly, the troop-carrying capabilities of the Bradley and Marder mean that whenever the terrain becomes dense (such as in forests or urban areas), putting valuable tanks at risk of deadly ambushes, infantry can jump in and drive off. Hit enemies hidden in buildings, trenches, or dense forests with cover fire from combat vehicles bristling with small but rapid-firing guns and anti-tank missiles. Once the obstacles are removed, the dismounted infantry can effectively defend a captured position against counterattacksor they quickly jump back into their combat vehicles and resume the advance without being pinned down by minor harassing fire.
It is also worth noting to critics of assistance to Ukraine that these vehicles are supplied at almost no cost, as the The US has over 2,000 Bradleys in storagewhile Germany and France are in the process of replacing their armed forces’ remaining Marders and AMX-10RCs in favor of newer designs.
No doubt there will be costs to help Ukraine train, supply and maintain these new, heavier vehicles. And some have complained that the 90 Bradleys and Marders are only enough to equip a single mechanized brigade, while Ukraine’s regular army began the war with 38 infantry and armored brigades.
However, given the numerous remaining Bradleys in storage and the gradual replacement by France and Germany of the AMX-10RC Y marder underway, it seems very likely that more will be delivered. The announced initial batch is likely a seed around which Ukraine can prepare training and logistics systems for future deliveries.
Some speculate that these vehicles could soon be followed by transfers of heavy tanks. After all, the US also has 3,700 dust-gathering Abrams tanks in storage, though the logistical challenges of restoring, transferring and integrating the 70-tonne tanks remain even greater, particularly given their high fuel consumption.
It is important to be realistic; nothing is guaranteed in war. However, the supply of new and stronger armored vehicles will improve Ukraine’s ability to liberate territory. That’s bad news for Putin, as he seeks to hold on to as much of Ukraine as possible, hoping to prolong hostilities and convince Kyiv’s supporters that further aid is futile. The sooner it becomes clear that the approach will not work, the shorter the duration of the war will be.